Bulletin n. 1/2016
June 2016
INDICE
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Matthew J. Dickinson and Jesse Gubb
    The Limits to Power without Persuasion
    in Presidential Studies Quarterly , Volume 46, Issue 1 ,  2016 ,  48–72
    Research on executive action often assumes that presidents face an either/or decision between issuing an administrative order and seeking legislation. This premise, however, ignores differing structural characteristics of administrative and legislative policy vehicles. This article will argue that, rather than see administrative actions as equivalent to legislation, presidents understand the distinct advantages and disadvantages each policy instrument brings and act accordingly. Using data linking executive orders (EOs) and presidential legislative proposals, as well as a case study of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, we show that when presidents issue more EOs, they do not issue fewer legislative proposals. In fact, presidents sometimes follow up on significant EOs with proposals to enshrine them in statute. Our research supports viewing EOs as a tool in the legislative toolbox rather than a challenge to the legislative process.
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