Bulletin n. 1/2015
June 2015
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Grimes William W.
    East Asian financial regionalism: why economic enhancements undermine political sustainability
    in Contemporary Politics , Volume 21, Issue 2, 2015 ,  2015 ,  145-160
    East Asian financial regionalism was born in response to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998. The centrepiece of financial regionalism was the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), an emergency liquidity mechanism created by the ASEAN+3. It embodied both a clear interpretation of what had gone wrong in 1997–1998 and an understanding of the need for institutions that would be politically viable despite Sino-Japanese rivalry. Enforcement under CMI relied on the ‘IMF link’ – release of funds would be predicated on crisis countries' initiating negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as a means of reducing moral hazard, enforcing conditionality and diverting blame from the leading creditors, Japan and China. The global financial crisis of 2008–2010 and the eurozone crisis that followed have inspired important changes meant to address CMI's economic gaps, including accelerated adoption of ‘CMI Multilateralization’ (CMIM), the creation of a new surveillance unit (ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Organization, or AMRO), and the establishment of a new precautionary line. Many observers have remarked that these developments weaken the IMF link, which had effectively subordinated CMI to the IMF. While the moves appear to demonstrate a more confident, autonomous regionalism and a relative devaluation of the US-dominated global financial institutions, this paper argues that in fact, the ASEAN+3 states have again unearthed the underlying politics of divided leadership and mutual suspicion. CMIM is now threatened by the renewed potential for internal divisions. Further complicating the picture, both China and Japan have recently established large bilateral swap lines outside of the CMIM framework with several of their ASEAN+3 partners, raising the question of whether CMIM is moving towards political irrelevance even as it has arrived at a high water mark in its institutional development.
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