Bulletin n. 1/2015 | ||
June 2015 | ||
Armesto María Alejandra |
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Competencia política y gasto particularista de los gobiernos subnacionales en México y Argentina | ||
in Latin American Research Review , Volume 50, Number 1, 2015 , 2015 , 160-183 | ||
The existing hypotheses about the relationship between political competition and particularistic spending predict opposite consequences. One view suggests that political competition—divided government—constrains the executive and reduces particularism; the opposite perspective predicts greater particularism as a result of side payments in exchange for legislative support. Both hypotheses rest on the assumption, which is not always true, that partisan veto players are present in the legislature. This article argues that this assumption is crucial for both hypotheses and shows that where this condition is not met the predictions do not hold. The article explores the effects of government with and without a majority on particularistic spending where legislatures are institutionally weak. To do so, it analyzes spending on local public goods by subnational governments in Mexico and Argentina and shows that government without a majority does not lead to any of the results anticipated by existing models. | ||