Bulletin n. 1/2015 | ||
June 2015 | ||
Jeremy C. Pope and Shawn Treier |
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Voting for a Founding: Testing the Effect of Economic Interests at the Federal Convention of 1787 | ||
in Journal of Politics (The) , Vol. 77, No. 2 , 2015 , 519-534 | ||
Previous work measuring the voting patterns of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention largely focused on either individual delegate positions for a handful of key votes or on state delegation positions for a far broader set of votes. We remedy this limitation by modeling the key first two months of the Convention including both some individual-level and all delegation-level voting, while simultaneously estimating the effect of various economic interests on that voting, controlling for various cultural and ideological factors. The findings suggest that economic factors mattered a great deal at the Convention. The effect of such interests vary however by the dimension of debate—representation, national institutional design, or federalism. We conclude that economic interests exerted a powerful influence on the deep structure of voting at Convention, though not consistently by issue or dimension. Specific interests only mattered on specific dimensions. | ||