Bulletin n. 1/2005
December 2005
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Erin Delaney
    Managing in a federal system without an ‘ultimate arbiter’: Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the EU and the ante-bellum United States
    in Regional and Federal Studies , Volume 15, Number 2 / June ,  2005 ,  225-244
    Although an ‘ultimate arbiter’ is generally accepted as a necessary element of a federation, emerging federal systems are often unable to agree on who should play the role. Legally, the debate surrounds the right to monitor the limits of federal and state competences – or the right to Kompetenz-Kompetenz. This article looks at how the early United States and the European Union managed without an ultimate arbiter and assesses the differing priorities of the two systems. It then examines how the Constitutional Treaty might change the delicate balance wrought by the European Court of Justice in Europe, and what lessons, if any, the early American experience might offer.
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