Bulletin n. 2-3/2012 | ||
October 2012-February 2013 | ||
Rogers James R. |
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Democracy and Necessity: Rightly Dividing Political Power. Using Simple Game Theory to Identify When Policy Decisions Should be Centralized and When Decisions Should be Decentralized | ||
in Europe en formation (L') , n. 363, 2012/1 , 2012 , 73-93 | ||
This paper uses very simple models to identify the set of policies that should be implemented at the state level and identifies conditions under which other policies should be delegated to a national government. I then show that under intuitively reasonable parameters, judicial enforcement of that boundary is better than leaving it to congressional self-enforcement (although reasonable parameters exist when self-enforcement would increase public welfare more than judicial enforcement). When applied as necessary, federal structures—i.e., the combination of centralized government in some areas and decentralized structures in other areas—is a democracy-enhancing institution as well as an efficiency-enhancing institution. | ||