Bulletin n. 2-3/2012 | ||
October 2012-February 2013 | ||
Acemoglu Daron, Egorov Georgy, Sonin Konstantin |
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Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs | ||
in American Economic Review , Vol. 102, No. 4, June 2012 , 2012 , 1446–76 | ||
In dynamic collective decision making, current decisions determine the future distribution of political power and influence future decisions. We develop a general framework to study this class of problems. Under acyclicity, we characterize dynamically stable states as functions of the initial state and obtain two general insights. First, a social arrangement is made stable by the instability of alternative arrangements that are preferred by sufficiently powerful groups. Second, efficiency-enhancing changes may be resisted because of further changes they will engender. We use this framework to analyze dynamics of political rights in a society with different types of extremist views. | ||