Bulletin n. 2/2011
October 2011
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Lemos Margaret H.
    State enforcement of federal law
    in New York University Law Review , Vol. 86, issue 3 ,  2011 ,  698-765
    Federal law is enforced through a combination of public and private efforts. Commentary on the choice between public and private enforcement has generated a remarkably stable set of arguments about the strengths and weaknesses of each type. But the conventional wisdom tells only part of the story, as it ignores variations within the category of public enforcement. Many federal statutes authorize civil enforcement by both a federal agency and the states. State enforcement is different from federal enforcement in several important respects, representing a unique model of public enforcement. The authority to enforce federal law is also a unique form of state power. As I show, enforcement authority can serve as a potent means of state influence by enabling states to adjust the intensity of enforcement and to press their own interpretations of federal law. To date, enforcement has been neglected in the federalism literature, which tends to equate state power with state regulation. But enforcement authority may exist outside of regulatory authority, allowing states to operate even in areas where state law is preempted or state regulators have chosen not to act. And enforcement empowers a distinct breed of state representatives—elected, generalist attorneys general. Just as state attorneys general differ from federal agencies as agents of enforcement, they differ from state agencies as agents of federal-state interaction. Moreover, attorneys general in most states are independent from the state legislature and governor, and may represent different constituencies. Enforcement authority therefore opens up new outlets for state-centered policy, empowering actors whose interests and incentives distinguish them from the state institutions that dominate other channels of federal-state dialogue. Full text available at: http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv3/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__journals__law_review/documents/documents/ecm_pro_069452.pdf
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