Bullettin n. 1/2011
June 2011
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Horvitz Sigmund A., Nehs Robert M.
    Proportionality and international humanitarian law: an economic analysis
    in Global Change, Peace & Security , vol. 23, n. 2 ,  2011 ,  195-206
    ABSTRACT: Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Conventions, in Article 57, mandates the rule of proportionality governing military attacks. The literature on international humanitarian law, however, reflects a widely-held view that this mandate is often ignored. Motivated by that view, this paper discusses three strategies, which, by appealing to ubiquitous social values, can encourage respect for and, in turn, compliance with the proportionality rule. These strategies are: first, interpreting a proportional attack as one which requires a rational and equitable balance, in cost–benefit terms, of the conflicting military and humanitarian interests, respectively, of the attacking and the attacked Parties (without sacrificing the desired military advantage of the former); second, requiring a planned attack to be ‘objectively proportional’, as measured by the preferences, quantified in statistical terms, of the ‘reasonable military commander’; and, third, requiring the attacking Party to compensate victims for incidental civilian damage resulting from an attack that is not objectively proportional. Observance of the principle of proportionality depends upon voluntary compliance, induced by respect for this principle, since compliance is not compelled under current international law.
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