Bullettin n. 1/2011
June 2011
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Soldatos Panayotis
    Le glissement constitutionnel de la CE/UE vers une gouvernance duale et polyarchique
    in Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne , n. 546, mars ,  2011 ,  147-155
    The institutional debate, in the context of the EU restructuring and systemic progress, is unsettled, increasingly uncertain, confusing, with unclear parameters, and seriously compromised by competing objectives (antagonistic goals, i.e. commercial/free trade preferences - vs. economic/political integration). Thus, the present study is aiming at clarifying the discussion by focusing on the following three analytical avenues: outlining the original supranational philosophy of the European Commission; identifying the three historical-political moments of rerouting the integration institutional aparatus towards a steadily rising intergovernmentalism (the 1965 crisis; the British admission; the introduction of the European Council); conceptualizing the present EU multipolar constitutional profile, consisting of a dual governance scheme and a polyarchic leadership. In qualitative terms, the study considers that such an institutional drift towards intergovernmentalism is not linear nor based, as some would argue, on a pragmatic approach of EU societal needs and goals or a new integrative philosophy; it is rather determined by confused, erratic political behaviour, with the institutional pendulum loosing its equilibrium. Thus, this paper, with a "policy-oriented" ocus, hopes to contribute to the restoring of the "constitutional memory" of the European integration process, with an emphasis on the underling institutional risks of a possible systemic breakdown, transforming the EU to a large economic zone of a more commercial essence.
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