Bullettin n. 1/2011
June 2011
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Benvenisti Eyal, Downs George W.
    Prospects for the Increased Independence of International Tribunals
    in German Law Journal , Vol. 12, n. 5 ,  2011 ,  1057-1082
    There appears to be a widespread perception, particularly among developing states, that international institutions continue to be disproportionately influenced by a small group of powerful states that played a dominant role in their creation and design. In recent years this has led to a growing acceptance among international legal scholars that the future legitimacy and credibility of international tribunals will be critically tied to the extent to which they are viewed as independent. To date, most of the literature on the independence of international tribunals, like most of the literature dealing with judicial independence at the domestic level, has focused on the rules connected with the ways that judges are nominated, selected, and tenured. While it is true that these formal structural features have an important role to play in determining judicial independence, they are not sufficient in and of themselves. The effectiveness of international tribunals and their freedom to interpret and develop the law in the way that they deem appropriate is also a function of attributes of the broader political context in which they are embedded. Full text available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol12-No5/PDF_Vol_12_No_05_1057-1082_Beyond%20Disptue%20Special_Benvenisti%20%20Downs%20FINAL.pdf
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