Bulletin n. 1/2005
December 2005
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Singh Raju, Plekhanov Alexander
    How Should Subnational Government Borrowing Be Regulated? Some Cross-Country Empirical Evidence
    in IMF Policy Discussion Papers , March, 2005 ,  2005
    Countries have adopted various institutional responses to subnational government borrowing. Using a sample of 44 countries 1982-2000, this paper provides a panel data analysis to determine the most effective borrowing constraints for containing local fiscal deficits. The results suggest that no single institutional arrangement is superior under all circumstances. The appropriateness of specific arrangements depends upon other institutional characteristics, particularly the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance, the existence of any bailout precedent, and the quality of fiscal reporting.
    ©2001 - 2020 - Centro Studi sul Federalismo - P. IVA 94067130016