Bulletin n. 2/2007
October 2007
CONTENTS
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Ahrens Joachim, Meurers Martin, Renner Carsten
    Beyond the Big-Bang Enlargement: Citizens' Preferences and the Problem of EU Decision Making
    in Journal of European Integration , Volume 29, Number 4 / September ,  2007 ,  447-479
    Given the increasing heterogeneity regarding economic structures, political interests, social preferences and financial constraints, governance problems in the EU will increase significantly. Based on a theoretical model of fiscal federalism, the question on which governance level political competencies should be located is addressed for the case of a heterogeneous union. The model suggests a distinct allocation of competencies in different policy fields depending upon the degree of country heterogeneity and the size of spillover effects of government services. Additionally, citizens' preferences regarding centralization and decentralization of policy prerogatives are analysed empirically. It is investigated whether the preferences are consistent with the theoretical implications, to what extent there are controversies within the groups of old and new EU members, and whether the scope for controversies changes within an enlarged union. Moreover, the preference distribution is used to simulate voting outcomes in the EU Council regarding the question of centralization. Finally, propositions are developed for a more flexible integration strategy that might help avoid a misallocation of political competencies.
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