Bulletin n. 3/2006 | ||
December 2006 | ||
Burkhart Simone, Manow Philip |
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Kompromiss und Konflikt im parteipolitisierten Föderalismus der Bundesrepublik Deutschland | ||
in Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft , 16. Jahrgang (2006), Heft 3 , 2006 , 807-824 | ||
Compromise and Conflict Party-political German Federalism The extent of the German second chamber’s legislative influence in situations of divided government has remained controversial. Using insights from the judicial review literature we contend that a strong opposition dominance in the Bundesrat usually does not lead to strong, open party-political conflict and the frequent failure of government’s initiatives. Rather, the government anticipates the opposition’s veto-potential and introduces more moderate proposals. However, if the opposition’s majority in the Bundesrat is narrow, both government and opposition opt for less moderate policy positions and legislation is characterized by intense party-political conflict. The paper’s hypotheses are tested on a detailed data set comprising all legislative activity in Germany between 1976 and 2002. The results confirm the importance of ‚legislative autolimitation‘ of the government and thereby underline the substantial influence of German Federalism on legislation. | ||