Bulletin n. 1/2017
June 2017
INDICE
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Houle Christian, Bodea Cristina
    Ethnic inequality and coups in sub-Saharan Africa
    in Journal of Peace Research , Volume 54, Issue 3, May ,  2017 ,  382-396
    Does ethnic inequality breed coups? The recent literature on civil war shows both that inequality between ethnic groups induces war and, importantly, that civil wars and coups, although fundamentally different, are related. The literature on coups d’état, however, has yet to theorize and test the effect of ethnic inequality on coups. The link is plausible because many coups are ‘ethnic coups’, which depend on the capacity of plotters to mobilize their co-ethnics. We argue that large income and wealth disparities between ethnic groups accompanied by within-group homogeneity increase the salience of ethnicity and solidify within-group preferences vis-à-vis the preferences of other ethnic groups, increasing the appeal and feasibility of a coup. We use group-level data for 32 sub-Saharan African countries and 141 ethnic groups between 1960 and 2005 and provide the first large-N test to date of the effect of ethnic inequality on coups. Between- and within-group inequality measures are constructed based on survey data from the Afrobarometer and the Demographic and Health Surveys. We find strong support for our hypothesis: between-ethnic-group inequality (BGI) increases the likelihood that an ethnic group stages a coup only when within-ethnic-group inequality (WGI) is low. Coups remain frequent in sub-Saharan Africa and coups are the main threat to democracy in the region, by harming democratic consolidation and economic development, and by provoking further political instability. Our work provides a novel rationale to be concerned about ethnic inequality, showing that when ethnic and income cleavages overlap, destabilizing coups d’état are more likely.
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