Bulletin n. 1/2017
June 2017
INDICE
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Mendelski Martin
    Das europäische Evaluierungsdefizit der Rechtsstaatlichkeit
    in Leviathan. Berliner Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft , Jahrgang 44 (2016), Heft 3 ,  2016 ,  366-398
    Abstract Liberal representatives of the European Union (EU) and adherents of liberal constitutionalism assess the recent „constitutional crises“ in Central and Eastern Europe as an attack on democracy and the rule of law. This one-sided assessment results, among others, from an inadequate rule of law evaluation methodology. The author of this paper identifies the EU’s rule of law evaluation deficit, which is reflected in three fundamental problems: (1) A quantitative “more is better” mindset, (2) A biased assessment of the rule of law, (3) Partisan “rhetoric action” in the name of the rule of law. The EU’s evaluation deficit is illustrated with selected examples of judicial reform and constitutional crises in CEE (e.g. Romania, Poland, Hungary). It is argued that given the EU’s inability to objectively and systematically assess the rule of law, the EU should either abstain from evaluating rule of law in member states and candidate countries or change its deficient evaluation approach, for instance by following the policy advice provided in this paper.
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