Bulletin n. 1/2017
June 2017
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
  • Jonathan Remy Nash
    Doubly Uncooperative Federalism and the Challenge of U.S. Treaty Compliance
    in Columbia Journal of European Law , Vol.14, issue 2 ,  2008 ,  3-64
    This Article explores the undertheorized and understudied phenomenon of doubly uncooperative federalism. While most commentary examining the behavior of U.S. states with respect to treaty regimes focuses on cooperative behavior-that is, states that aid in the implementation of duly ratified treaties, or even aid in the implementation of treaties that the federal government has yet to ratify-this Article focuses on settings of doubly uncooperative federalism. There, state action (or inaction) is inconsistent with a duly ratified treaty, and may put the national government in breach of the treaty. The Article elucidates the theoretical underpinnings of doubly uncooperative federalism; discusses doubly uncooperative federalism in practice; explains how constitutional and practical limitations on the federal government's ability to compel state compliance create a space for doubly uncooperative federalism; exposes shortcomings in ways the federal government might try to minimize doubly uncooperative federalism; and discusses the consequences of doubly uncooperative federalism-both positive and negative.
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