Bulletin n. 2/2016 | ||
December 2016 | ||
O’Neill Onora |
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Enactable and Enforceable: Kant’s Criteria for Right and Virtue | ||
in Kant-Studien , Volume 107, Issue 1 (Mar 2016) , 2016 , 111–125 | ||
Abstract Kant’s distinction between duties of right and of virtue remains controversial, for a number of reasons. A close look at the distinctions he draws and the claims that he makes suggests that a distinction between the requirements of enforceable duties of right and of unenforceable duties of virtue is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. It is not exclusive because it is possible to fulfil duties of right as a matter of principle, in which case what is done is both right and virtuous. It is not exhaustive because certain duties, among them the duty to enter a civil condition and duties of equity, are not in principle enforceable, yet are duties of right. | ||