Bulletin n. 2/2016
December 2016
INDICE
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
    • Alejandro Bonvecchi
    Crises, Structures, and Managerial Choice in Economic Policy Making: Presidential Management of Macroeconomic Policy in Argentina and the United States
    in Presidential Studies Quarterly , Volume 46, Issue 3 ,  2016 ,  507–530
    What explains presidential choices of management structures for economic policy making? The literature on the organization of the presidency has proposed two main answers: personality traits or institutional constraints. But management structures change less than expected from variation in presidential personalities, more than expected from institutional stability, and not necessarily triggered by crises. This paper offers an alternative, cognitive-based theory of presidential management choices. When economic crises are rare, presidents usually institutionalize collegial management structures; when crises are more frequent, they generally switch to hierarchical structures. The theory is tested by comparing management structures in Argentina and the United States.
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