Bulletin n. 2/2016 | ||
December 2016 | ||
Daniel Seikel |
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Flexible Austerity and Supranational Autonomy. The Reformed Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Asymmetry between Liberalization and Social Regulation in the EU | ||
in Journal of Common Market Studies , Volume 54, Issue 6 , 2016 | ||
This paper analyzes how th e apparently merely technical introduction of reversed qualified major-ity voting for the excessive deficit procedure included in the Six Pack and the Fiscal Compactshifts not only the institutional balanc e between the European Commission and the Member Statesbut also the relationship between liberaliza tion and social regulation in the EU. In bringing to-gether institutional analysis and a political economy perspective, th e paper shows how thestrengthening of the Commission’s discretionary decision-making authority in a context of inter-governmental power imbalances between debtor and creditor states extends the asymmetrybetween market-mak ing and market-correction to the area of political decision-making. In conse-quence, economic and social policies are subordinated to the primacy of austerity. | ||