Bulletin n. 2/2016
December 2016
  • Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government
  • Section B) Global governance and international organizations
  • Section C) Regional integration processes
  • Section D) Federalism as a political idea
  • Astrid Lorenz
    How differently actors cope with demanding constitutional amendment rules: two types of constitutional politics in federal democracies
    in Regional and Federal Studies , Volume 26, Issue 5 ,  2016 ,  729-748
    The article seeks to explore why a high formal hurdle for constitutional amendments (constitutional rigidity) as it is present in Germany does not automatically lead to a lower number of amendments when compared with low rigidity countries and why Germany’s amendment rate is so much higher than that of some other federations. It theorizes that the frequency of interactions between stable, interdependent actors influences their willingness to compromise. Thus analyses of constitutional politics must expand the focus to longer time-horizons and to the parliamentary and federal context. Case studies on constitutional politics in two parliamentary federations, Germany and Canada, confirm that actors cope differently with the problem of multiple veto players in constitutional politics. In the long run, two distinct patterns of constitutional politics have emerged.
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