SPECIAL ISSUE | ||
Birney Mayling |
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Decentralization and Veiled Corruption under China’s “Rule of Mandates” | ||
in World Development , Volume 53, Decentralization and Governance, January , 2014 , 55-67 | ||
This paper shows why corruption is especially difficult to detect under China’s system of decentralized authoritarian rule, which I call a “rule of mandates.” Local officials must pursue high priority political targets but have immense discretion over which laws to implement. A relative standard for corruption consequently arises since non-implementation of laws may be mandate-serving or may be corrupt; and determining which requires extra information on why non-implementation occurred. The theory is supported by evidence from original survey and case research on the implementation of the village elections law. I discuss implications for anticorruption efforts, development patterns, and future research. | ||